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It is widely speculated that the adoption of a technology takes off to be self-sustaining if 
it reaches the critical mass. However, the sponsors of competing technologies may 
engage in strategic maneuvering in the adoption process. Indeed, this paper shows that in 
the de facto standardization process of the U.S. home VCR market, there was strategic 
maneuvering by the Betamax sponsor, which created only temporary interruptions. The 
counterfactual simulations, however, indicate that there is no irreversible critical mass 
and the sponsor of Betamax could reverse the tipping process if it had a critical strategic 
advantage which is determined by the difference in installed bases and other factors of 
consumer expectations for future adoption rates. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: network externalities; de facto standardization; strategic maneuvering;  
critical advantage; VCR.  
 
JEL Classification: L15; L11; L68. 
 
                                                 
* I am grateful for the comments from the participants of the 3rd IEEE Conference on Standardization and 
Innovation in Information Technology. All errors and omissions are my own.   1
1. Introduction 
 
  Since the study by David (1985) of the adoption of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard, 
the possible lock-in to inferior technology by historical accidents has attracted economists’ 
attentions.1 Arthur (1989), based on a simple non-strategic (or biological) model, demonstrates 
that random historical (small) events may lead to this type of lock-in with the existence of 
increasing returns to adoption. Network externalities, which are usually understood as positive 
consumption externalities, have been considered a source of these increasing returns to adoption.2 
The recent empirical study of Park (forthcoming(a)), based on a structural model of dynamic 
oligopoly, provides a dynamics of de facto standardization in the presence of network 
externalities.3 This dynamics is called an amplification-reinforcement process and indicates that 
the small difference in the initial installed bases, which were accumulated prior to the network 
externalities in action (via the consumer’s use of prerecorded videocassettes such as movie titles), 
amplified the difference in sales between VHS and Betamax via network externalities, leading to 
a bigger advantage with more installed bases. Moreover, this amplification-reinforcement process 
in the presence of network externalities was reinforced by the expected future dominance of VHS, 
and this expectation itself became the main reason for the network advantage of VHS in the early 
stage of competition.  
                                                 
1 Some researchers argue that the QWERTY typewriter keyboard was not inferior. See Liebowitz and 
Margolis (1990). 
2 In general, network externalities are categorized as either direct or indirect. In the presence of (direct or 
indirect) network externalities, an increase in the users of a product raises the consumer’s utility level and 
hence the demands for that product directly (as in the case of fax machines) or indirectly (via an increased 
variety of available movie titles as in the case of VCRs). In the literature of network externalities, the 
number of users is called a network size, and the user’s benefit from the network size is called a network 
benefit. Refer to Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Park (forthcoming(c)) for the literature review and the recent 
issues. 
3 Previous theoretical studies have focused on the consumers’ adoption decision of new technology over 
old technology (Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Choi, 1994) or producers’ introduction timing and compatibility 
decision of new technology (Katz and Shapiro, 1992; Kristiansen, 1998) in the presence of network 
externalities.   2
Apparently, this interpretation of Park (forthcoming(a)) is consistent with the popular 
idea of the critical mass: the adoption of a technology with network externalities takes off to be 
self-sustaining if it reaches the critical mass (see, for example, Allen, 1987; Economides and 
Himmelberg, 1995; Lim, Choi and Park, 2003; Mahler and Rogers, 1999; Markus, 1987). 
However, extending the results in Park (forthcoming(a)), this paper will highlight two very 
important factors in the technology adoption process, i.e., strategic maneuvering and consumer 
expectations for future adoption rates, which have not been explicitly analyzed in the typical 
diffusion models (see Allen, 1987; Economides and Himmelberg, 1995; Lim, Choi, and Park, 
2003; Mahler and Rogers, 1999; Markus, 1987; Saloner and Shepard, 1995).  
In contrast to the model in Arthur (1989), technologies are typically sponsored by firms 
which engage in strategic maneuvering in the adoption process.4 In fact, there was strategic 
maneuvering (in price and product quality) of Betamax, which created only a temporary 
interruption of the tipping and de facto standardization process toward the VHS format. In the 
paper, based on counterfactual simulations of the U.S. home VCR market during the years 1981 – 
1988, we study the dynamics between the network externalities and the strategic advantages (in 
price and quality) in the process of de facto standardization. The counterfactual simulations will 
indicate that there is no irreversible critical mass and the sponsor of a technology can reverse the 
tipping process if it has a sufficient strategic advantage in price and/or product quality which is 
called the critical advantage. The critical advantage, however, is not an absolute amount of 
strategic advantages but depends on the difference in installed bases and the other market 
conditions which affect consumer expectations for future adoption rates. In addition, it will be 
shown that the difference in installed bases (or seemingly the critical mass) is not a trigger but an 
amplifier-and-reinforcer of the bandwagon effect in the presence of network externalities.5  
                                                 
4 For instance, the two competing technologies in the home VCR market (the Betamax format and the VHS 
format) were sponsored by Sony and Matsushita, respectively. Katz and Shapiro (1986) shows that the 
pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored or not. 
5 The initial installed bases can be a critical advantage in as in the case of the U.S. home VCR market.   3
  The counterfactual simulations of this paper are based on the structural demand function 
in the market for newly introduced durable products with network externalities. Instead of fully 
calibrating the structural model in Park (forthcoming(a)) and the equilibrium behavior of entry 
and exit, we will decompose (the logarithm of) the relative sales of two competing technologies 
(the Betamax and the VHS formats) into the advantage in network effects, the strategic advantage 
in price and quality, and the lineup advantages. Since we are mainly interested in the effects of 
strategic advantages in price and product quality on the de facto standardization process, the 
strategic advantage is considered a control variable in our simulations.6 Note that the effects of 
consumer expectations for adoption rates are reflected in the network advantages since the 
network effect is the average network benefit (in the current and future periods) projected by 
current available information. The lineup advantage of VHS was generated by the licensing 
agreements between the sponsors and the licensees which allow entry into the VHS lineup and 
the exit from the Betamax lineup. However, the reason that the more producers (or licensees) 
have positive effects on the format sales is consumers’ preferences for the variety of the products. 
Hence, the lineup advantage reflects that the sponsor can amplify the relative sales, if its 
technology is more advantageous, via licensing for product differentiation. Then, with further 
calibrations on the advantage in network effects and the lineup advantage, we can directly 
calculate the impacts of strategic advantages on the dynamics of the competing technologies.  
  The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will briefly review the results in 
Park (forthcoming(a)) and proceeds further to discuss strategic maneuvering in the de facto 
standardization process of the U.S. home VCR market. Section 3 presents the calibration 
assumptions and the simulation results. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
  
2. Strategic Advantages and de Facto Standardization in the U.S. Home VCR Market 
                                                 
6 The strategic advantage is an equilibrium outcome in pricing and R&D games, which in principle can be 
calculated from the primitives of the games. Refer to section 3 for the related computational issues.   4
 
We begin with a brief review of the structural demand function in Park (forthcoming(a)) 
in the market for newly introduced durable products with network externalities. In many 
examples of network externalities, products such as VCRs are durable goods. In the case of 
durable goods, the consumer may take into account not only the current utility but also the 
expected future utilities derived from the use of a product. This dynamic concern of the consumer 
is represented by the consumer’s valuation function, which is composed of the average (of the 
present value of) network benefit and the average (of the present value of) stand-alone benefit of 
the product in current and future periods. To reflect consumers’ idiosyncratic tastes for 
differentiated products, the stand-alone benefit is specified as in the nested logit model of 
McFadden (1973), Berry (1994) or Cardell (1997). Note that the network benefit in a period 
depends on the network size (the number of old and new users) of the product’s format (VHS or 
Betamax in the VCR case). Hence the network benefit changes over time although the stand-
alone benefit remains the same. The average network benefit of format g in period t, say Ngt, is 
called the network effect of the format in the period. That is, 
∑ ≥
− + − =
t s )] ( [ ) (1 gs gs t
t s
gt q B E N κ ϕ ϕ  where ϕ  is the consumer’s discount rate, Et[⋅ ] is the 
rational expectation operator, κ (⋅ ) is a single-period network benefit function, and qgt and Bgt are 
sales and installed base of format g in period t.  
Then, we can obtain the market share function of product j, say Sjt, and the market share 
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where pjt is the price of product j in period t, λ  is the marginal utility of price in the nested logit 
model,  jt δ  is the quality of product j, σ  is the within-format correlation coefficient, and 
] ) 1 /( ) exp[( ∑ ∈ − + + − =
g J j gt jt jt gt N p D σ δ ϕλ  with Jg denoting the set of all the products of 
format g. The quality of product j,  jt δ , can be understood as a real function of product 
characteristics while the within-format correlation coefficient, σ , is greater than or equal to zero 
and less than one, and approaches one as the within-format correlation of utility levels goes to 
one. The demand function for product j in period t, say qjt, is: qjt = Mt⋅ Sjt, where Mt is the market 
size (the number of potential buyers). 
  Estimating the market share function in (1) and the corresponding pricing equation, Park 
(forthcoming(a)) quantitatively analyzes the extent to which network externalities contributed to 
the de facto standardization of the VHS format in the U.S. home VCR market during the years 
1981 - 1988. The competition between the VHS format and the Betamax format is a well-known 
example of network externalities. During the years 1981 - 1988, neither VHS nor Betamax was 
significantly superior in performance, features or prices. Nonetheless, tipping toward and de facto 
standardization of the VHS format occurred. The estimation results in Park (forthcoming(a)) 
indicate that the network advantage of VHS explains at least 70.3 percent to 86.8 percent of the 
logarithm of relative sales of VHS to Betamax in each year. In other words, the network 
advantage of VHS was the key reason that VHS outsold during the years 1981 – 1988. Moreover, 
Park (forthcoming(a)) finds that an increase in the network advantage of VHS was an engine of 
tipping toward the VHS format, and in the early 1980’s, the network advantage of VHS was 
mainly due to its expected dominance in the future. Noticing that the only difference between 
these two formats in the early 1980’s was in installed bases accumulated prior to the network 
externalities in action (via the consumer’s use of prerecorded videocassettes such as movie titles), 
Park (forthcoming(a)) infers that the small difference in the (initial) installed bases amplified the   6
difference in sales between VHS and Betamax via network externalities and then was reinforced 
to be bigger. This amplification-reinforcement process in the presence of network externalities 
might be reinforced by the expected future dominance of VHS, and this expectation itself became 
the main reason for the network advantage of VHS in early 1980’s. Hence we infer that the initial 
installed base advantage satisfied the critical advantage in the U.S. home VCR market. 
The tipping and de facto standardization process in the U.S. home VCR market, however, 
was affected by the strategic maneuvering of sponsoring firms. For instance, there was a surge 
(an increase of the market share) of Betamax in 1983 in the process of the de facto 
standardization toward VHS. In the paper, based on the estimates of Park (forthcoming(a)), we 
will further analyze the strategic maneuvering of Betamax in the de facto standardization process. 
We begin by decomposing the log (or logarithm of) relative sales of the VHS format to Betamax 
format, say ln(qvt / qbt), from the format market share function in (1) as follows. Henceforth, it is 
understood that all the variables are indexed by period t. 
 
  = ) / ln( b v q q ] [ b v N N −  +  ] [ b v δ δ − ] [ b v p p − − ϕλ () )] ( /# ) ( ln[# 1 b v J J σ − + ,     (2) 
 
where δ v (δ b) is the average quality of VHS (Betamax) VCRs,  ) (   b v p p  is the quality-adjusted 
average price of the VHS (Betamax) format, and #(Jv) (#(Jb)) is the number (or the lineup) of 
VHS (Betamax) producers. Refer to the appendix for the derivation of (2). On the right-hand side 
of equation (2), the first term is called the network advantage of VHS, the second term the 
average quality advantage of VHS, the third term the average price advantage (APA) of VHS, and 
the last term the lineup advantage of VHS. The sum of the average quality advantage and APA 
(i.e.,  ] [ b v δ δ −   ] [ b v p p − − ϕλ ) is called the average price/quality advantage (APQA), which 
measures the strategic advantage of VHS. The sum of APQA and the lineup advantage of VHS is 
called price/quality advantage (PQA) in the paper.    7
Figure 1 illustrates VHS’s PQA, APA and APQA in each year for 1981 – 1988 except in 
1985.7 Since the distance between APQA and APA indicates the average quality advantage, we 
can infer that there was almost no difference in average quality between Betamax and VHS 
during these years except 1987 although Betamax maintained slight advantages until 1986.8 
However, VHS had a visible price advantage on average except in 1983, 1986, 1987 and 1988.9 
Overall the APQA of VHS had negative values in these four years, which implies that Betamax 
had strategic advantages in those years. Figure 1 implies that the surge of Betamax in 1983 was 
mainly due to the APA of Betamax. However, a more aggressive strategic maneuvering of 
Betamax in 1987 (primarily due to its average quality advantage) did not make any apparent 
interruption in the de facto standardization toward VHS.10 
Although the strategic advantages of Betamax in 1983 and 1987 were relatively 
substantial (compared with those in 1986 and 1988) and resulted in the decreases in PQA of VHS 
from the previous levels, VHS’s advantage in the lineup of producers dominated Betamax’s 
APQA even in 1983 and 1987. Note that the difference between PQA and APQA of VHS 
represents the lineup advantage of VHS in figure 1. The lineup advantage of VHS was generated 
by the licensing agreements between the sponsors and the licensees which allow entry into the 
VHS lineup and the exit from the Betamax lineup. However, the reason that the more producers 
(or licensees) have positive effects on the format sales is consumers’ preferences for the variety 
of the products which are reflected in the nested logit specification of the utility function. 
Different producers of the same format VCRs may still be differentiated by consumers’ 
idiosyncratic tastes for the reliability and the brand images of the producers. Indeed, the within-
                                                 
7 Relevant data are not available in 1985. 
8 This conclusion is consistent with the perception discussed in Park (forthcoming(a)) and the published 
articles such as in Consumers Reports and others during 1980’s. 
9 Note that during the years in question, many new VHS producers entered the U.S. market and they 
usually had focused on low-end models with relatively inexpensive prices. 
10 Considering that the installed base advantage of VHS became much bigger in 1987, these observations 
suggest the significance of the applications barrier to entry in the presence of (indirect) network 
externalities. We will revisit and detail this issue in section 3.   8
format correlation coefficient, σ , is estimated to be 0.805 in the U.S. home VCR case, which 
indicates that the VCRs of the same format are much closer substitutes to each other but still are 
perceived as differentiated products. Hence, the sponsor will have an incentive to license for 
product differentiation. On the other hand, more licensees might join the lineup of the VHS in the 
tipping and de facto standardization process which was mainly caused by its huge network 
advantages. Therefore, the lineup advantage of VHS reflects indirect contribution of the network 
advantage of VHS via increased product varieties. 
 
3. Counterfactual Simulations 
 
We now proceed to conduct several simulations to study the impacts of strategic 
maneuvering in price/quality advantages on the de facto standardization in the presence of 
network externalities. The counterfactual simulations of the paper are based on the decomposition 
of the format market share function in (2). Since we are mainly interested in the effects of 
hypothetical strategic advantages in price and product quality on the de facto standardization 
process, the strategic advantage (APQA) is considered a control variable in our simulations. 
Indeed, the strategic advantage is an equilibrium outcome in pricing and R&D games. In principle, 
we can adapt the computational algorithms in Pakes and McGuire (1994, 2001) to our simulations 
to solve the equilibrium. However, it will induce tremendous computational burden to explicitly 
solve the whole structural system of these games along with the specifications of the primitives of 
the games (leading to predatory behavior (with long purse) or successful R&D outcomes required 
to generate a critical advantage). For related computational issues, refer to Benkard (2000), 
Huang and Park (in process), and Park (2003). The following counterfactual simulations will 
indicate that there is no irreversible critical mass and the sponsor of a technology can reverse the 
tipping process if it has a critical advantage which depends on the difference in the installed bases 
and other factors of consumer expectations for future adoption rates.    9
 
3.1. Calibrations  
 
   We begin with the calibration of the lineup advantage. As discussed in section 2, the 
lineup advantage of VHS was generated by the product differentiation of various licensees, and 
higher (expected) relative sales of VHS to Betamax might induce a greater lineup advantage of 
VHS. Moreover, if the products of a format are perceived more differentiated (i.e., σ  has a 
smaller value), the lineup advantage might be greater. Hence we assume as follows. 
 
ASSUMPTION 1: The lineup advantage of VHS, () )] ( /# ) ( ln[# 1 b v J J σ − , is equal to a 
decreasing non-negative function of σ , say f(σ ), times the log relative sales of VHS to 
Betamax,  ) / ln( b v q q . 
 
Assumption 1 together with equation (2) implies that log relative sales of VHS to Betamax are 
multiplied by 1/(1- f(σ )) due to the lineup advantage of VHS. Table 1 reports the regression result 
of the lineup advantage of VHS onto the space spanned by the log relative sales of VHS to 
Betamax for the years from 1981 to 1988 except 1985. It turns out that the multiplier, f(σ ), is 
estimated to be almost same with 1 - σ . In addition, the lineup advantages of VHS are very well 
fitted by the estimated value: during the years, the lineup advantages divided by the fitted values 
of these advantages lie between 0.997 and 1.001. 
As presented in section 2, the network effect is the average network benefit (in the current and 
future periods) projected by current available information such as installed bases, prices, product 
qualities and sales. However, in equation (2), we need only to calculate the network advantage 
(instead of the network effect itself) of VHS. Hence we will utilize the estimates of the network  
   10
          TABLE 1 
  Regression of the Lineup Advantage of VHS 
    
    
    Variable        Estimate       St. Error
    
      
) / ln( b v q q    0.195  0.00007
      
    
 
 
advantage of VHS in Park (forthcoming(a)) to calibrate the functional form of the network 
advantage of VHS which is assumed as follows. 
 
ASSUMPTION 2: The network advantage,  b v N N − , is a function of the installed base  
advantage,  b v B B − , the average price quality advantage,  ] [ b v δ δ −   ] [ b v p p − − ϕλ , 
and the log relative sales,  ) / ln( b v q q .  
 
To calibrate the functional form of the network advantage, we begin by regressing the network 
advantage onto the space spanned by the installed base advantage, the log relative sales, and the 
average price/quality advantage. However, it turns out that the average/price quality advantage 
contributes insignificantly to the prediction of the network advantage in our specific case. As 
shown in figure 1, there had been no substantial difference in the average price/quality advantage 
between VHS and Betamax for the years in question. Furthermore, our regression results indicate 
that the linear function of the installed base advantage and the log relative sales fits the network 
advantages very well: the network advantages divided by the fitted values of these advantages lie 
between 0.932 and 1.068. The linear regression result is reported in table 2. 
   11
          TABLE 2 
  Regression of the Network Advantage of VHS
    
    
    Variable        Estimate       St. Error
    
      
) / ln( b v q q    0.745  0.039
  b v B B −    0.012  0.006
      
    
 
 
There are several noteworthy issues in the calibration of the network advantages. First, 
although the linear function of the installed base advantage and the log relative sales fits the 
network advantages very well, the network advantages are underestimated only in 1983 and 1987 
in which the average price/quality advantage of Betamax was substantial. The observation 
suggests that consumer expectations for network effects did not fully reflect the changes in log 
relative sales induced by a one-shot strategic advantage. Hence, in the following simulations, we 
may have downward biases in path of the log relative sales of VHS to Betamax induced by a one-
shot strategic advantage of Betamax. Second, on the other hand, if the strategic advantage of 
Betamax is expected to sustain, the network advantage via the changes in log relative sales may 
not fully reflect consumer expectations for future network effects. In other wards, it is likely that 
an increased strategic advantage has more impacts on the de facto standardization process if the 
sustained average price/quality advantage affects the network advantages (or consumer 
expectations for the difference in network effects) directly as well. Lastly, if these exists any 
public policy or business strategy which can credibly affect consumer expectations for future 
adoption rates, it will, like the average price/quality advantage, affect network advantages directly 
as well as indirectly via changes in log relative sales, and thus can play a role in the adoption of 
technologies.   12
  Based on the estimation results in table 1 and table 2 and the data on installed bases, we 
can simulate from equation (2) the changes of the relative sales induced by a different level of 
strategic advantages. In the beginning year of our simulations, say t, we have the information on 
the installed base advantage from our data. However, since we can calculate only the relative 
sales in year t, we need to have the total VCR sales in year t in order to calculate changes of the 
installed base advantages in year t+1 under different hypothetical situations. Since we do not 
explicitly solve the equilibrium of the entire structural model, we cannot predict the total VCR 
sales under different hypothetical situations. Hence, we assume the following in our simulations. 
 




Under the calibration assumptions, we now calculate from equation (2) the path of 
ln(qb/qv) in our counter-factual experiments, which will show that there is no irreversible critical 
mass and the sponsor of Betamax with the critical advantage could reverse the tipping process. As 
indicated in figure 2, VHS seems to have achieved the critical mass around 1982 and 1983. The 
one-shot strategic maneuvering of Betamax in 1983, as discussed in section 2, created only a 
temporary interruption in the tipping process toward VHS. In 1984, the yearly increase in the 
relative sales of VHS to Betamax had recovered, and the tipping process was back on track. The 
following simulations, however, will show that the sponsor of Betamax could reverse the tipping 
and de facto standardization process from 1983 if it had the strategic advantage in 1983 at the 
level of its 1987’s or if it had sustained its strategic advantages with direct effects on consumer 
expectations for the network advantages. Hence, the seemingly critical mass of VHS in 1983 did 
not actually lead to the further rate of adoption to be self-sustaining.   13
Figures 3 - 5 illustrate the calculated paths of ln(qv/qb), Nv – Nb, and Bv – Bb in our 
experiments. When the de facto standardization of VHS was fulfilled in 1988, the value of 
ln(qv/qb) was 3.749. Hence we assume that the de facto standardization of VHS is achieved if 
ln(qv/qb) gets bigger than 3.749 while the de facto standardization of Betamax is done if ln(qv/qb) 
gets smaller than -3.749.11  
Figure 3 shows that the strategic advantage of Betamax in 1983, even if it had been 
lasting, was not sufficient to reverse the tipping process, and the de facto standardization of VHS 
might have been accomplished in 1989. However, the simulation in figure 4 shows that the 
sponsor of Betamax could reverse the tipping process toward VHS if it had the same amount of 
strategic advantages in 1983 as it did in 1987. In this case, the sales of Betamax would surpass 
those of VHS immediately from 1983. The log relative sales of VHS to Betamax, however, would 
rise in 1984 and then decrease from 1985 along with the rapid reversed tipping process toward 
Betamax. The strategic advantage was sufficient to reverse the installed base advantage from 
1984, and the installed base advantage of Betamax became the main force of the de facto 
standardization toward Betamax from 1984 via the amplification-reinforcement process. The de 
facto standardization of Betamax would occur in 1989 under this scenario. Indeed, our 
simulations indicate that 42 percent of the 1987’s strategic advantage of Betamax is the minimal 
advantage (i.e., critical advantage) to reverse the de facto standardization process. As discussed in 
section 3.1, our simulations may have downward biases in path of the log relative sales of VHS to 
Betamax induced by a one-shot strategic advantage of Betamax. However, these simulation 
results indicate the existence of the critical advantage although it might be underestimated in the 
current calibration.  
There are a couple of noteworthy issues before we proceed. First, it is questionable 
whether Betamax was ever able to have strategic advantages as the level of 1987’s. In 1987, VHS 
                                                 
11 In principle, we need to calculate the value functions of the sponsors with further information on the sell-
off values, which are very difficult to estimate or obtain.   14
already had huge installed based advantage and network advantage, and the tipping process was 
in its final stage. The strategic maneuvering of Betamax in 1987 might not be due to Betamax’s 
technological advantages (e.g., providing high-edge models at a lower production cost). As 
discussed, the equilibrium price and product quaity will depend on strategic interactions as well. 
The big strategic advantage of Betamax in 1987 might be possible because the VHS producers 
did not aggressively respond to Betamax’s deep price cut in the final stage of the de facto 
standardization. On the other hand, the Betamax producers might have had incentives to sell as 
many Betamax VCRs as possible prior to the de facto standardization. Recall that neither of the 
two formats could surpass the other during the years in question. Without any significant 
cost/quality advantages or long purse, an aggressive strategic maneuvering of Betamax in the 
earlier stage of the tipping process must have been matched by the strategic response of VHS. 
Second, the simulation result in figure 4 as well as the fact that the strategic advantage of 
Betamax had no significant impacts on the tipping process suggests the significance of the 
applications barrier to entry in the presence of (indirect) network externalities. In the presence of 
indirect network externalities, the network effect represents the consumer’s average benefit from 
available software products (such as movie titles in the VCR case). Hence, we can infer that if an 
incumbent has a big advantage in network effects due to a great variety of available software 
products (as a function of installed base advantages), the potential rival even with a significant 
cost or quality advantage may not enter the market since the incumbent’s network advantage 
dominates the potential entrant’s advantage in cost or quality.12 
As discussed in section 3.1, if the strategic advantage of Betamax is expected to sustain, 
the network advantage calibrated in table 2 may not fully reflect consumer expectations for the 
changes in network effects. Suppose now that the sustained average price/quality advantage 
                                                 
12 Refer to Park (forthcoming(b)) for the interactions between hardware and software products. The related 
empirical studies include Gandal, Kende, and Rob (2000) which directly used the number of movie titles 
available to the CD players to examine the interdependence between consumers’ CD player adoptions and 
the CD supplies.   15
affects the network advantages (or consumer expectations for the difference in network effects) 
directly as well. Figure 5 indicates that if the strategic advantage in price and quality contributes 
directly to the network advantage with the coefficient of 1.2, the tipping process would be 
reversed. The installed base advantage of VHS would rise in 1984 but begin to slide from 1985. 
From 1986, the Betamax sales would surpass those of VHS due to the advantage in price and 
quality along with reduced difference in installed bases. From 1987, Betamax would have the 
network advantage due to the higher relative sales and the sustained advantage in price and 
quality. From 1989, Betamax would begin to have the installed base advantage due to the 
cumulative sales difference since 1986. Finally, Betamax would become the de facto standard in 
1992. Hence, an increased strategic advantage may have more impacts on the de facto 
standardization process if the sustained average price/quality advantage affects the network 




The de facto standardization of the VHS format in the U.S. home VCR market is a well-
known example of de facto standardization in the presence of network externalities. The 
estimation results in Park (forthcoming(a)) suggest that the small difference in the (initial) 
installed bases prior to network externalities in action lead ultimately to the de facto 
standardization of VHS via the amplification-reinforcement process. Apparently, this 
interpretation is consistent with the idea of critical mass. However, in the paper, we showed that 
the sponsor of Betamax engaged in the strategic maneuvering in this tipping and de facto 
standardization process, which was short of reversing the process. Furthermore, the 
counterfactual simulations indicated that there is no irreversible critical mass and the sponsor of a 
technology could have reversed the tipping process if it had the critical advantage. The critical 
advantage is not an absolute amount of strategic advantages in price and product quality but   16
determined by the difference in installed bases and other factors which affect consumer 
expectations for future adoption rates. Hence, any public policy or business strategy which can 
credibly affect consumer expectations for future adoption rates will play a role in the adoption of 




Let v denote VHS and b denote Betamax. From the market share function of formats in 
equation (1), the logarithm of the relative sales (log relative sales, hereafter) of the two formats 
can be decomposed into the sum of two differences as follows. 
 
  ln( / ) qq vb = ] ln( ) )[ln( (1 ] [
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Let  j p  be the quality-adjusted price of product j in the VHS format defined as:  j p  =  
ϕλ δ δ / ) ( v j j p − − . The quality-adjusted price of product j in the Betamax format can be 
defined similarly. Then the second term of the right-hand side in equation (A.1), if it is positive, 
represents the price/quality advantage (PQA) of VHS, which can be further decomposed as 
follows.  
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We now define the quality-adjusted average price of the VHS format, say  v p , as: 
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ϕλ σ . The quality-adjusted average price of the   17
Betamax format, say  b p , can be defined similarly. Then the second term of the right-hand side of 




















σ  =  
] [ b v p p − − ϕλ () )] ( /# ) ( ln[# 1 b v J J σ − + .   (A.3)    
 
Combining (A.1) to (A.3) together, we can obtain equation (2) of section 2.    18
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